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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

WORDS AS WEAPONS: ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS THAT
RESULT IN SUICIDE AND THE UNCOMFORTABLE TRUTH WITH
CRIMINAL CULPABILITY BASED ON WORDS ALONE

INTRODUCTION
In 2012, teenagers Michelle Carter and Conrad Roy III formed a romantic
relationship, which primarily consisted of online and cell phone
communication. 1 The relationship was discrete, for even Conrad’s best friend
was unaware of its existence. 2 In July of 2014, Conrad’s body was found by
police inside the cabin of his pickup truck. 3 Conrad had parked at a K-Mart in
Fairhaven, Massachusetts and used a combustion engine to poison himself with
carbon monoxide. 4 Conrad and Carter lived approximately fifty miles apart
and had not seen each other for approximately a year prior to Conrad’s death. 5
Even so, on August 21, 2015, a grand jury issued an indictment charging
Carter with involuntary manslaughter for assisting in Conrad’s suicide. 6 Carter
is being tried in juvenile court since she was seventeen at the time of Conrad’s
death, but could still serve up to twenty years in state prison. 7 The

1. Commonwealth’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 1, Commonwealth v. Carter, No.
15YO0001NE (Mass. Dist. Ct. Aug. 21, 2015) [hereinafter “Resp. to Def.’s Mot.”].
2. Id.
3. Id. at 17.
4. Id.
5. Denise Lavoie, Texts Led to Suicide, Prosecutor Says, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept.
9, 2015, 1:43 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2015/09/09/teen-charged-with-en
couraging-her-boyfriend-to-kill-himself.
6. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 1.
7. Michael E. Miller, ‘Manslaughter by text’: teen faces charges after boyfriend kills
himself, THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Sept. 26, 2015), http://www.smh.com.au/world/
manslaughter-by-text-teen-faces-charges-after-boyfriend-suicides-20150925-gjv9xk.html. The
Commonwealth of Massachusetts is permitted to seek an indictment against a juvenile who
committed a specific type of violent crime if they were seventeen at the time of the offense.
Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 1 N.E.3d 237, 242 (Mass. 2013). Once an indictment is
successfully obtained, the juvenile is classified as a youthful offender who is proceeded against in
juvenile court even though they may be treated as an adult in other respects. Id. For example,
their court proceedings are not shielded from the public, they may receive an adult sentence, and
they may serve their prison sentence in an adult correctional facility or state prison. Id. The
juvenile court also retains jurisdiction over children who turn eighteen while their cases are
pending. Id. at 241. The manslaughter penalty under MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 13
(LexisNexis 2016) states that a defendant convicted of manslaughter may not be sentenced to
113
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prosecution’s argument that Carter assisted in the suicide of Conrad and that
her actions constituted involuntary manslaughter rests on three theories: Carter
counseled him to overcome his doubts 8 for more than a week prior to his
suicide via hundreds of text messages, 9 Carter researched and devised the plan
to run the combustion engine within his truck, and Carter directed him to go
back into his truck after he exited because he was frightened that the plan was
working. 10 Furthermore, Carter lied to the police and Conrad’s family
regarding his whereabouts, both while he was committing the act itself and
afterwards, implying that she had no knowledge of the incident. 11
Carter had asked Conrad to delete their exchange of text messages before
he followed through with the suicide, however, authorities still recovered
them. 12 The morning Conrad killed himself, Carter had texted him, “You can’t
think about it. You just have to do it. You said you were gonna do it. Like I
don’t get why you aren’t.” 13 “You can’t keep living this way. You just need to
do it like you did the last time and not think about it.” 14 Carter was aware that
Conrad attempted suicide two years earlier, received counseling, and had a
history of anxiety and depression. 15 After the incident, Carter felt guilt and
remorse and wrote to one of her friends, “[If] they read my messages with him
I’m done. His family will hate me and I can go to jail.” 16 “[H]is death is my
fault. Like, honestly, I could have stopped it. I was the one on the phone with
him and he got out of the car because [it] was working and he got scared and I
told him to get back in.” 17 “I’m the reason everyone was in that church
yesterday.” 18 “I helped ease him into it and told him I was okay . . . I could
have easily stopped him or called the police but I didn’t.” 19 In total, Carter and

more than twenty years in prison. Commonwealth v. Brown, 1 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Mass. 2013).
Judges thereby have discretion in deciding defendants’ terms. Id.
8. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 1.
9. Abby Phillip, ‘It’s now or never’: Texts reveal teen’s efforts to pressure her boyfriend
into suicide, WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix
/wp/2015/08/31/its-now-or-never-texts-reveal-teens-efforts-to-pressure-boyfriend-into-suicide/.
10. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 6–7.
11. Phillip, supra note 9.
12. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 40.
13. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 1.
14. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 1.
15. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 6; see also Lavoie, supra note 5. After his prior
suicide attempt, Conrad spent time in a psychiatric hospital according to his Aunt. Id. However,
she stated that Conrad “did not have the signs.” Id. Conrad’s grandfather further explained that
Conrad seemed happy in the days before his suicide. Id. He blamed Carter: “We saw the light at
the end of the tunnel, and [Carter] just blew that tunnel up. She shut the light off.” Id.
16. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 20.
17. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 21.
18. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 20.
19. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 21–22.
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Conrad shared over one-thousand text messages in the weeks leading up to his
suicide. 20 On the evening that Conrad took his life, Carter’s final text message
to Conrad read, “You can do this.” 21 Three minutes later Conrad called Carter,
and they spoke on the phone for ninety minutes until Conrad successfully
poisoned himself. 22 Prosecutors allege that Carter’s motive was to receive as
much attention and sympathy as possible from her family and friends after
Conrad’s death. 23
According to Carter’s defense attorney, Joseph Cataldo, this case is
unprecedented in the state of Massachusetts, and he is unaware of any cases in
the state “where a person who is thirty miles away is charged with committing
manslaughter by text.” 24 Former Massachusetts prosecutor, Rikki Klieman,
acknowledges that while the accusations facing Carter are “horrendous,” the
facts do not fit neatly into any existing statute in Massachusetts. 25 “It’s not
cyberbullying, it’s not harassment, it’s not stalking. So the prosecutor says,
‘This is reprehensible conduct, disgusting conduct, must-be punished conduct,’
so he goes forward and says, ‘Let’s call this involuntary manslaughter.’ Does it
neatly fit in that definition? Not so much.”26
When severe incidents like Conrad’s result in suicide and receive national
attention, prosecutors are forced to “shoe-horn” these incidents into ill-fitting
statutes in an aggressive attempt to criminally punish the perpetrators. 27 This
comment will address three different charges that prosecutors may utilize in
these types of scenarios: cyberbullying, assisted suicide, and involuntary
manslaughter. This is an analysis of each charge through the lens of Conrad’s
case and will address the hurdles the prosecution must overcome in order to
convict Carter under each offense. Part I of this comment will compare current
state cyberbullying laws and critique the major gaps and First Amendment
breaches in the promulgation of these statutes. This part will focus on severe
cyberbullying incidents that result in suicide and will propose an effective
criminal procedure to combat cyberbullying that does not over-criminalize
cyberbullies. This part will then assess the likely effect of these proposed
amendments as applied to Conrad’s case. Part II will compare how the states

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Miller, supra note 7.
Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 16.
Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 17.
Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 22.
Stephanie Slifer, Is it a crime to “encourage suicide”? Teens’ texts under scrutiny, CBS
NEWS (Mar. 3, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/is-it-a-crime-to-encourage-sui
cide-unusual-massachusetts-case-of-conrad-roy-and-michelle-carter/.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Justin W. Patchin, Most Cyberbullying Cases Aren’t Criminal, CYBERBULLYING
RESEARCH CTR. (Oct. 12, 2010), http://cyberbullying.org/most-cyberbullying-cases-arentcriminal/.
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address assisted suicide and focus on the recent statutory modifications that
further require some physical act beyond pure speech in order to reach a
conviction. This part will then propose that each state adopt more stringent
statutes, as some states have already begun to, and further analyze Carter’s
actions in the context of different states’ assisted suicide laws. Part III will lay
out the prosecution’s prima facie claim under involuntary manslaughter and
assess how difficult it will be to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Carter’s
words alone caused Conrad to take his own life. Finally, Part V will propose
that while Carter’s text messages are reprehensible, this does not mean they are
criminal.
I. CYBERBULLYING
A.

The Growing Technological Era and the Confusion Surrounding
Cyberbullying

At first glance, Carter’s text messages appear to be a disturbing case of
cyberbullying as Carter consistently urged Conrad to kill himself. 28 Youth
suicide continues to be a significant public-health concern in the United States,
and one major factor that has been linked to suicide is cyberbullying. 29 Bullies
have always existed, but cyberbullying is a unique offense growing more and
more prevalent as technology advances. 30 Due to the convenience and constant
access provided by cell phones, the average teen spends nine hours a day using
media, including computers and cell phones. 31 Geographical limitations no
longer restrain a bully’s reach, and victims can now be bullied at any time of
the day or even in their own homes. 32 Electronic communications further
provide anonymity to the perpetrator and allow for widespread public
distribution, making them severely dangerous and cruel for adolescents. 33 It is

28. Lavoie, supra note 5.
29. Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Cyberbullying Research Summary,
CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH CTR. (2010), http://cyberbullying.org/cyberbullying_and_suicide_
research_fact_sheet.pdf.
30. Haley E. Phillips, Online Bullying and the First Amendment: State Cyberbullying
Statutes After People v. Marquan M., 93 N.C.L. REV. 179, 183 (2015).
31. Landmark Report: U.S. Teens Use an Average of Nine Hours of Media Per Day, Tweens
Use Six Hours, COMMON SENSE MEDIA (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.commonsensemedia.org/
about-us/news/press-releases/landmark-report-us-teens-use-an-average-of-nine-hours-of-mediaper-day (not including the time spent using media for school or homework).
32. Lyrissa Lidsky & Andrea Pinzon Garcia, How Not to Criminalize Cyberbullying, 77 MO.
L. REV. 693 (2012).
33. Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act of 2008, 110 H.R. 6123, 106th Cong. § 2(3)
(2008) [hereinafter “Cyberbullying Prevention Act of 2008”]. Online victimizations are
associated with emotional distress and other psychological problems, including depression.
Cyberbullying can negatively impact academic performance, safety, the well-being of children in
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no surprise public officials have called for the “elimination” of
cyberbullying, 34 however, the vast majority of cyberbullying cases are not
categorized as criminal nor should they be. 35 Tragic incidents such as suicides
often transform these into high-profile cases that receive national attention and
unsurmountable public scrutiny. 36
It is important to acknowledge that many teenagers who commit suicide
subsequent to being cyberbullied have other emotional and social issues
impacting their lives. 37 In fact, studies have shown that approximately ninetypercent of suicide victims were mentally ill. 38 It is unlikely that being a victim
of cyberbullying by itself will lead to suicide; rather, “it tends to exacerbate
instability and hopelessness in the minds of adolescents already struggling with
stressful life circumstances.” 39 Carter’s defense attorney contends that
Conrad’s history of depression and prior suicide attempt where he overdosed
on acetaminophen 40 were the ultimate cause of Conrad’s suicide and that he
likely had a predisposition to take his own life. 41 The defense also asserts that
Carter repeatedly tried to talk Conrad out of killing himself and only decided to
support his plan when it became evident she was incapable of changing his
mind. 42 Approximately one month before his suicide, Carter suggested that
Conrad seek treatment at a psychiatric hospital where she was already
receiving treatment for her own condition. 43 Conrad refused and suggested
they both kill themselves together “like Romeo and Juliet.” 44 Carter’s attorney
goes so far as to accuse Conrad of “brainwash[ing]” Carter into supporting his
plan to take his life by “ultimately persuad[ing] a young, impressionable

school, force children to change schools, and in some cases lead to extreme violent behavior, such
as murder and suicide.
34. Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 32, at 695. The United Nations, for example, has called for
concerted efforts to eliminate bullying in all regions, which includes cyberbullying. Special
Representative of Secretary-General on Violence Against Children reasons that “[b]ullying is a
very serious problem and still a taboo in modern societies.” UN Envoy Calls for Concerted
Efforts to Eliminate Bullying in All Regions, UN NEWS CENTRE (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.un.
org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=52292#.VsY_hJMrI9c.
35. Patchin, supra note 27.
36. Patchin, supra note 27.
37. Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 29, at 2.
38. Risk of Suicide, NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, https://www.nami.org/LearnMore/Mental-Health-Conditions/Related-Conditions/Suicide.
39. Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 29, at 2.
40. Lavoie, supra note 5.
41. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 36.
42. Lavoie, supra note 5.
43. Lavoie, supra note 5.
44. Lavoie, supra note 5. See also infra notes 184–186 (for a more in depth analysis on
suicide pacts).
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girl.” 45 Conrad and Carter’s dialogue of text messages was not the typical
exchange of words between a cyberbully and a victim. Among the many texts,
Carter wrote to Conrad, “You’re finally going to be happy in heaven. No more
pain. No more bad thoughts and worries. You’ll be free.” 46 Carter appeared to
be in love with Conrad: “I love you to the moon and back . . . . You are my
beautiful guardian angel forever and ever.” 47
While cyberbullying incidents resulting in suicide are isolated and do not
represent the norm, 48 society agrees that cyberbullying is troublesome. 49
Nonetheless, not everyone agrees on exactly which types of conduct
cyberbullying should encompass, how far these statutes should reach, or the
appropriate punishment for violators. 50 A universal definition of cyberbullying
has not yet been defined; however, researchers acknowledge that one is
overdue. 51 The National Conference of State Legislatures has defined
cyberbullying as the “willful and repeated use of cell phones, computers, and
other electronic communication devices to harass and threaten others.” 52 This
definition includes four main components: (1) deliberate behavior, not merely
accidental; (2) repeated behavior, more than a one-time incident; (3) harm
occurred from the victim’s perspective; and (4) is executed through a
technological medium. 53 Contrarily, the federal government’s interagency
working group has adopted the broad definition of “any type of harassment or
bullying (teasing, telling lies, making fun of someone, making rude or mean
comments, spreading rumors, or making threatening or aggressive comments)
that occurs through email, a chat room, instant messaging, a website (including
blogs), or text messaging.” 54 Both of these definitions are in stark contrast to

45. Phillip, supra note 10.
46. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 3.
47. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 2. See generally Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1
(detailing all of the text messages that the district attorney released in their full context).
48. Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 29, at 1.
49. Symposium, Cyberbullying: Emerging Realities and Legal Challenges: Foreword, 77
MO. L. REV. 613, 614 (2012) [hereinafter “Emerging Realities”].
50. Id.
51. Charles E. Notar, Cyberbullying: A Review of the Literature, 1 UNIVERSAL J. OF EDUC.
RES. 1, 2 (2013), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ1053975.pdf.
52. Cyberbullying, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGIS. (Dec. 14, 2010), http://www.ncsl.org/re
search/education/cyberbullying.aspx. This definition was created by the NCSL. For more
information on the NCSL, visit http://www.ncsl.org/aboutus.aspx.
53. Kelly A. Albin, Bullies in a Wired World: The Impact of Cyberspace Victimization on
Adolescent Mental Health and the Need for Cyberbullying Legislation in Ohio, 25 J.L. & HEALTH
155, 157 (2012).
54. Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 32, at 698–99. This definition was issued by a government
“working group” comprised of representatives from seventeen federal agencies that support
programs and services focusing on youth. Electronic Aggression, YOUTH.GOV, http://youth.gov/
youth-topics/teen-dating-violence/electronic.
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one another and fall on opposite ends of the spectrum. One encompasses
seemingly malicious and repeated acts, while the latter could include typical
juvenile behavior. It is challenging enough to resolve an issue when society
agrees on its exact definition. Consequently, one of the major challenges in
prosecuting cyberbullies is the unclear scope of behaviors the laws are trying
to deter. 55 This further leads to the major constitutional flaws with existing
cyberbullying laws: the legislatures’ overly ambitious attempt to “eliminate”
cyberbullying and thereby integrating its definition as a social problem with
the legal definition of cyberbullying as a crime. 56 While broad social models of
the definition of cyberbullying may be useful in devising policy responses to
the issue, lawmakers need to create more narrow, “perhaps less politically
satisfying” definitions of cyberbullying. 57
B.

Lack of a Federal Cyberbullying Law: United States v. Drew

Presently, there are no federal laws that directly address cyberbullying. 58
However, in 2009, the Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act was
introduced to the House of Representatives although it was never enacted. 59
Thirteen-year-old Megan Meier’s story was a prominent one, for it was the
signal event that revolutionized cyberbullying into a national issue ultimately
resulting in legal reform. 60 Beginning in 2006, defendant Lori Drew and her
co-conspirators created a fake social media account on MySpace as a sixteenyear-old boy under the alias of “Josh Evans.” 61 The defendant led Megan to
believe that Josh had a romantic interest in her and won Megan’s trust up until
he cruelly notified her he no longer wanted to be friends. 62 He concluded by
telling her, “The world would be a better place without [you] in it.” 63 Megan
responded, “You’re the kind of boy a girl would kill herself over.” 64 It was

55. Emerging Realities, supra note 49, at 614.
56. Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 32, at 698.
57. Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 32, at 699.
58. Federal Laws, STOPBULLYING.GOV, http://www.stopbullying.gov/laws/federal/in
dex.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2016). Federal case law does allow schools to discipline students
for off-campus behavior that results in a substantial disruption of the learning environment at
school. The states have codified that standard in state statutes. See infra note 74, at 1; see also
infra notes 76–78 (discussing the states’ statutes).
59. See, e.g., Cyberbullying Prevention Act of 2008, supra note 33; see also infra, notes 103,
105–109 (discussing why the Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act of 2008 was not
enacted).
60. Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 32, at 700.
61. United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 452 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Rebecca Cathcart, Judge Throws Out Conviction in Cyberbullying Case, N.Y. TIMES
(July 2, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/03/us/03bully.html?_r=0.
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approximately twenty minutes after Megan left the computer screen that she
hung herself in her bedroom. 65
The county prosecutor declined to file any criminal charges, while the
federal prosecutor creatively interpreted law and charged the defendant with
one count of conspiracy 66 and three violations of the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act (the “Act”) for “intentionally access[ing] a computer used in
interstate commerce without (and/or in excess of) authorization in order to
obtain information for the purpose of committing the tortious acts of
intentional infliction of emotional distress on [Megan].” 67 Essentially, the
defendant was being charged with violating MySpace’s terms of service by
“defrauding” MySpace and misrepresenting her identity and motive. 68
Megan’s case exemplifies what happens when there is no explicit
cyberbullying law in place, and highly aggressive prosecutors innovatively
attempt to stuff these incidents into existing statutes that do not fit the
circumstances. 69 In many cases this misdirection of prosecutorial resources is
not done consistently or appropriately. 70 Nonetheless, a federal district judge
overturned the jury verdict finding the defendant guilty of this misdemeanor
violation of the Act. 71 The judge reasoned that to uphold this conviction would
“transform the [Act] into an overwhelmingly overbroad enactment that would
convert a multitude of otherwise innocent Internet users into misdemeanant
criminals.” 72 While the defendant in this case escaped criminal liability, she
still suffered severe social condemnation for her despicable conduct. 73
C. States’ Legislative Response Through School Based Remedies and the
Drawbacks
While no federal cyberbullying law has successfully been enacted, in
recent years every state has passed some type of legislation to address the issue
of bullying in general. 74 Among these statutes, the ones that directly address
cyberbullying can be divided into two main categories: states that advise public
schools to implement anti-bullying policies and procedures and those that

65. The Top Six Unforgettable Cyberbullying Cases Ever, NOBULLYING.COM, (Dec. 22,
2015), http://nobullying.com/six-unforgettable-cyber-bullying-cases/.
66. Id.
67. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 452–453.
68. See id.
69. Patchin, supra note 27.
70. Patchin, supra note 27.
71. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 452.
72. Id. at 466.
73. Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 32, at 702.
74. See Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, State Cyberbullying Laws, CYBERBULLYING
RESEARCH CENTER, http://cyberbullying.org/Bullying-and-Cyberbullying-Laws.pdf.
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criminalize cyberbullying specifically both on and off campus. 75 In total, there
are twenty-three states that have adopted statutes that include cyberbullying
and eighteen of which impose criminal sanctions. 76 However, these approaches
fail to effectively address severe cases of cyberbullying, including instances
where suicide results. 77 The most common types of statutes are those that
merely regulate school policies and fail to directly address cyberbullying by
perpetrators outside of the school system, private school cyberbullies, or
incidents that occur off of school campuses 78 where a majority of online
communication between teens occurs. 79 With so many students carrying cell
phones, schools have begun to enact rules banning cell phone use at school. 80
This suggests that the majority of the cyberbullying taking place among teens
is not confined to school premises.
Maine’s statute resembles most states when it comes to regulating school
board policies. 81 It prohibits both bullying and cyberbullying on campus and
further requires school boards to create policies with specific procedures in
place for anonymously reporting bullies, referring identified bullies to
counseling, and carving out disciplinary action for violators. 82 In 2010,
Massachusetts, where Carter and Conrad resided, was one of the states that
passed an anti-bullying law that included the prohibition of cyberbullying. 83 It
addresses those behaviors that “materially and substantially disrupt the
education process or the orderly operation of a school.” 84 Ultimately, these
school-based policy statutes fail to reach perpetrators like Carter, who did not
go to the same school as Conrad, and they do not encompass adults or parents
of students like the defendant that targeted Megan Meier. Additionally, while
some states’ school policy statutes apply to private schools, other states do not
extend these protections to private school students. 85 States that fail to

75. See id.
76. See id. Hawaii, Michigan, and New York all currently propose criminal sanctions.
77. Phillips, supra note 30, at 191.
78. Phillips, supra note 30, at 184. See also, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193–F:4 (2011);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.666 (2010); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:16–7.7 (2015) (requiring
only public school districts and chartered public schools to implement anti-cyberbullying
policies).
79. Infra notes 82–83.
80. Catherine Donaldson-Evans, Schools Make Rules For Cell Phone No-Nos, FOX NEWS
(Sept. 23, 2004), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2004/09/23/schools-make-rules-for-cell-phoneno-nos.html.
81. Phillips, supra note 30, at 185.
82. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20–A, § 6554 (2015).
83. See, e.g., Anti-Bullying and Harassment Act of 2011, H.R. 975, 112th Cong. (1st Sess.
2011).
84. Id.
85. Phillips, supra note 30, at 185; see also Donaldson-Evans, supra note 80, and
accompanying text.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

122

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVI:113

recognize cyberbullying in their anti-bullying statutes and states that merely
regulate at the school level are failing to account for the outlying cases such as
Conrad and Megan Meier’s.
D. Additional Criminal Cyberbullying Statutes
As a companion, some states have recently begun to enact their own
aggressive cyberbullying statutes that impose criminal sanctions on violators in
response to some of these high-publicity cases resulting in suicides. 86 These
statutes are broad and generally apply to anyone who harasses a minor online
as opposed to only applying to public school students. 87 North Carolina is a
prime example of what these statutes entail. 88 North Carolina makes it a
misdemeanor for anyone to engage in a number of online harassment activities,
that includes but is not limited to, creating a fake online profile, pretending to
be a minor online, or “us[ing] a computer system for repeated, continuing, or
sustained electronic communications” with the intent to “intimidate” or
“torment” a person. 89 Other popular attributes in state laws include a broad
definition of “electronic communications” and require “malicious” intent. 90
While these state laws attempt to address the major gaps in school-based
policy statutes and at first glance seem favorable, they also create their own
hazards and are difficult to enforce. 91 Above all, cyberbullying statutes are

86. Phillips, supra note 30, at 186. Other states have utilized tort remedies, while several
cities and counties also have ordinances against cyberbullying. Id. at 184, 187. However, not all
states draft entirely new legislation. Some follow Missouri’s legislative path: in response to
Megan Meier’s case in 2008, Missouri modernized its existing criminal harassment statute
(codified at MO. REV. STAT. § 565.090 (2016)), invalidated in part by State v. Vaughn, 366
S.W.3d 513 (Mo. 2012) (severing subsection (5) from the act as unconstitutionally overbroad).
Many states amend their harassment or stalking laws to further encompass cyber versions of these
offenses. Although amendments of this type only seem like minor adjustments to cover new,
electronic means of committing acts that are already criminal, these amendments inevitably target
“non-physical” harassment and stalking, which only consists of expressive conduct. Without
arduous drafting in the expansion of these laws, cyber stalking and cyber harassment would be
unlikely to withstand constitutional challenges. Seemingly, legislatures would be better off
creating entirely new laws as opposed to amending old ones. Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 32, at
700.
87. Phillips, supra note 30, at 186.
88. Phillips, supra note 30, at 186.
89. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14–458.1 (2016).
90. Phillips, supra note 30, at 186; see, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3–805(a)(2)
(2016)(broadly defining electronic communications as the transmission of information, data, or
communication by the use of a computer or any other electronic means that is sent to a person and
that is received by the person); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.7(A) (with the malicious and
willful intent to coerce, abuse, torment, or intimidate a person under the age of eighteen).
91. Phillips, supra note 30, at 186–88. Many adolescents do not feel comfortable reporting
these incidents, and they often go undetected until it is too late. There are also issues such as law
enforcement’s lack of expertise in the realm of cyberspace and relatively limited resources and
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difficult to draft without running afoul of the First Amendment. 92 Many
cyberbullying laws criminalize broad sweeps of online communication, and as
a result, the statutory language would unlikely withstand constitutional
vagueness and overbreadth challenges. 93 By failing to define terms such as
“intimidate” or “harass,” statutes would likely be rendered impermissibly
vague and infringe on our constitutional right to freedom of speech. 94 For
example, if a victim is extremely reserved or has been isolated from society,
merely using swear words in an online forum could rise to the level of
intimidation or harassment. 95 Moreover, by criminalizing these laundry lists of
online behaviors, the laws encompass an extremely wide range of online
activities, some of which fall outside of an appropriately tailored definition of
cyberbullying. 96 For example, there is the possibility that the statute would
criminalize adding a juvenile’s name to a spam list. 97 In People v. Marquan
M., New York’s Court of Appeals was the first court to strike down a county’s
cyberbullying statute on constitutional grounds because the statutory language
as written was not “fairly susceptible to an interpretation that satisfies
applicable First Amendment requirements.” 98 If the reasoning of the Court in
Marquan M. was applied to various other criminal cyberbullying statutes,
several would likely be held unconstitutional because they criminalize online
speech too generally. 99
Had the Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act passed into federal
law, it would have “amend[ed] the federal criminal code to impose criminal
penalties on anyone who transmits in interstate or foreign commerce a
communication intended to coerce, intimidate, harass, or cause substantial
emotional distress to another person, using electronic means to support severe,
repeated, and hostile behavior.” 100 As drafted, Megan’s Act received little
enthusiasm from the House subcommittee who thought the measure was an
unconstitutional breach of free speech. 101 The committee’s chairman warned
knowledge of cybercrimes. Further, by prohibiting online activities based on the author’s intent
and adding this mens rea requirement, i.e. that the perpetrator acted intentionally, purposefully, or
willfully, it is challenging to reach convictions because mental states are often difficult to prove
in all areas of criminal law. Id.
92. Phillips, supra note 30, at 188.
93. Phillips, supra note 30, at 180.
94. Phillips, supra note 30, at 201.
95. Phillips, supra note 30, at 201.
96. Phillips, supra note 30, at 186.
97. Phillips, supra note 30, at 202.
98. Phillips, supra note 30, at 181 (citing People v. Marquan M., 19 N.E.3d 480 (N.Y.
2014).
99. Phillips, supra note 30, at 181; see generally Marquan M., 19 N.E.3d at 480.
100. See, e.g., Cyberbullying Prevention Act of 2008, supra note 33.
101. David Kravets, Cyberbullying Bill Gets Chilly Reception, WIRED (Sept. 30, 2009, 6:37
PM), http://www.wired.com/2009/09/cyberbullyingbill/.
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that “[w]e need to be extremely careful before heading down this path.” 102 The
law could unintentionally punish political or other forms of speech; for
example, a blogger coercing a politician into voting a particular way. 103 By
repeatedly using a hostile tone, the author could be using electronic means to
transmit a communication into interstate commerce with the intent to coerce,
therefore violating the law. 104 Megan’s Act further proposed up to two years of
imprisonment for violators. 105 The committee therefore was concerned that the
legislation was “over-criminaliz[ing].” 106 Promulgating new and zealous
cyberbullying laws can also be considered over-criminalizing because the
legislature is essentially creating new crimes that overlap with existing ones. 107
These statutes often coincide with assault, battery, eavesdropping, wiretapping,
and threat-making, among other crimes. 108 As a result, cyberbullies, most of
which are juveniles, run the risk of being disproportionately punished for their
wrongdoing when prosecutors charge them with multiple offenses or
unwarranted charges with severe sentences. 109 Ultimately, the states’
haphazard cyberbullying laws fail to account for perpetrators like Carter and
offer no assistance in the prosecution of Conrad’s case.
E.

How to Effectively Combat Severe Incidents of Cyberbullying

Legislators are struggling to find a comprehensive and effective solution to
protect cyberbullying victims without drafting statutes that would likely be
subject to significant vagueness and overbreadth challenges under the First

102. Id.
103. Larry Magid, Stop Cyberbullying with Education, Not New Law, CNET (July 19, 2009,
12:20 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/stop-cyberbullying-with-education-not-new-law/.
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., Cyberbullying Prevention Act of 2008, supra note 33 at § 3(a)(a).
106. Kravets, supra note 101.
107. Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 32, at 697–698. Douglas Husak, a professor of philosophy,
has studied the principle of over-criminalization in depth. He has attempted to formulate a theory
for identifying “criminal laws that are justified” and “those that are not.” He identified the
creation of “overlapping crimes” as one example of over-criminalization. He further explains that
overlapping crimes often come about when tragedies, such as youth suicides, attract national
media attention, and, as a result, officials publicly pledge to take action to prevent similar cases in
the future. Oftentimes, this consists of the enactment of a seemingly new offense. Husak explains
that new statutes are necessary if they truly prohibit harmful and culpable conduct that was not
already criminalized. Such cases, however, are rare. Far more typically, the original conduct was
already prohibited by law, and the new offense actually describes that criminal behavior in greater
specificity, while imposing a more severe sentence. As is the issue in this case, the new law
frequently involves the use of a technological innovation such as a cell phone or computer. Id.
(citing generally DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
(2008).
108. Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 32, at 698.
109. Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 32, at 698.
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Amendment or over-criminalizing cyberbullies. 110 As a result of the major
gaps in current laws, the atypical cases that result in suicide have no effective
criminal procedure in place. The inconsistencies among the states leave many
unanswered questions. 111 The behaviors that constitute cyberbullying evolve
drastically from state to state and from school campuses to students’ homes. 112
The penalties for cyberbullying outside of school intervention range from civil
penalties to misdemeanors and felonies with prison sentences. 113 It is also
unclear if cyberbullying should be criminal in the first place, and if so, should
warrant a manslaughter charge with a long prison sentence like Carter, a
misdemeanor as in Megan Meier’s case, or some lesser offense. After all, most
cyberbullying violators are juveniles. To punish juveniles so harshly in an area
of the law that is so arbitrary and underdeveloped seems unjust.
Lawmakers’ reflexive criminalization of cyberbullying due to political and
emotional pressure is understandable; however, simultaneously criminalizing
common childhood wrongdoing, especially when committed through speech,
can lead to unfavorable consequences. 114 Legislatures have been too ambitious
in their attempt to “eliminate” cyberbullying and have tried to encompass far
too much conduct in one statute, thereby potentially violating the First
Amendment. 115 As of now, statutes are drafted to deter incidents ranging from
adults in an online forum telling children to go kill themselves to name-calling
among teenagers through text messages. I suggest that lawmakers clearly
define four different categories of cyberbullying, including: (1) minor conduct
that schools are better equipped to tackle through administrative responses; (2)
severe conduct that rises to the level of criminal such as threats and stalking;
(3) tortious conduct such as invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, libel, and defamation; and 116 (4) merely ill-mannered
conduct that is better left stigmatized by public shaming and shunning. 117 Not

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Emerging Realities, supra note 49, at 617.
See Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 74.
See Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 74.
See Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 74.
Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 32, at 697.
Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 32, at 712.
Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 32, at 718.
See, e.g., Daniel Solove, More facts about the Megan Meier Case, CONCURRING
OPINIONS (Dec. 7, 2007), http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2007/12/more_facts_a
bou.html. After Megan Meier’s trial, Drew (the defendant) received death threats and repulsive
insults. On the Internet, she was portrayed as a monster who should go to prison, lose custody of
her children, or worse. Her name and address were posted online, and an Internet site with
satellite images of her home said she should “rot in hell.” Her home-based business was run into
the ground because she lost all of her clients. Someone obtained Drew’s cell phone password to
replace her voicemail recording with a disturbing message. Her neighbors had reported that she
had not been seen outside for a lengthy amount of time, and the sheriff in her town reported that
patrols had drastically increased around the Drew residence for fear of her safety.
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all of these issues can be resolved through statutory law nor should they be. 118
Criminal statutes should focus on only criminalizing particularly troublesome
forms of narrowly defined online activities, such as threats, stalking, fighting
words, repetitive speech, and adult-to-student speech since children are more
emotionally vulnerable and have a higher necessity for these types of
protections. 119 While narrow legislation of this type of specificity is not as
politically popular, it is far more likely to uphold to First Amendment
scrutiny. 120 By distinguishing between different degrees of cyberbullying and
creating separate solutions for what only seems like one major social issue,
prosecutors are capable of a more tightly drawn and effective response to these
severe incidents without over-criminalizing any of these types of behaviors.
Most significantly, states are failing to account for the mental illnesses that
the overwhelming majority of suicidal cyberbullying victims suffer from. 121
Since it is unlikely that being a victim of cyberbullying by itself will lead to
suicide, laws should address that at some point the cyberbully is no longer the
cause of the victim’s decision to end their own life. Ideally, the states need to
find common ground between psychological research and legal research in
order to better grasp the role that mental illness plays in suicides before
concluding that cyberbullies’ words were the sole cause of the suicides.
Navigating these subtle and often wavering lines of criminal culpability lends
itself to strong evidence that the appropriate remedy for these types of cases
may be found in the civil courts.
Even if the Massachusetts legislature was to amend their current
cyberbullying statutes as proposed, Carter’s words would still unlikely rise to
the level of criminal. On its face, Carter pressuring Conrad to commit suicide
through text messages is atrocious; however, Carter and Conrad’s relationship
did not resemble that of a typical cyberbully and their victim. 122 When viewed
alone Carter’s text messages are troublesome, but there are also excerpts where
they displayed their love to one another and where Carter urged Conrad to go
to the psychiatric hospital where she was already receiving treatment for her
own condition. 123 According to Carter’s defense attorney, “It should be further
noted the district attorney did not release all of the various text messages which
showed for months prior to Conrad Roy’s suicide Miss Carter continuously
requested he seek help.” 124 Carter was his confidant and romantic interest. 125

118. Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 32, at 725.
119. Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 32, at 725.
120. Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 32, at 725.
121. Risk of Suicide, supra note 38.
122. See generally Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1.
123. See generally Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1.
124. Lindsay McCane, Michelle Carter: Conrad Roy III’s Girlfriend Charged with
Involuntary Manslaughter for his Suicide, Inquisitr (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.inquisitr.com/240
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Conrad had told her that she was one of the reasons he had not yet committed
suicide: “Without you and my family I’d be long gone.” 126 Moreover,
Conrad’s history of depression and prior suicide attempt raise the inference
that Conrad would have taken his life without the assistance of Carter’s text
messages. As the legislatures struggle to draft cyberbullying laws that can
withstand constitutional scrutiny, it becomes more clear that the First
Amendment does not allow criminal law to be used to punish every social
contravention when committed through speech alone.
II. ASSISTED SUICIDE
A.

Defining Assisted Suicide and the Recent Statutory Modifications

Carter’s conduct more closely resembles what some states’ assisted suicide
laws ban. Allegedly, the lack of a criminal prohibition against assisted suicide
in Massachusetts makes the case against Carter “an uphill battle for the
prosecution.” 127 However, even if Massachusetts did outlaw assisted suicide,
in many states her conduct would still remain outside the scope of the
statute. 128 Assisted suicide is defined as “[the] intentional act of providing a
person with the medical means or the medical knowledge to commit suicide,”
which is not to be confused with physician-assisted suicide which occurs
“when a doctor provides the means.” 129 Carter was the one who devised the
plan to poison Conrad through the use of a combustion engine that would
generate carbon monoxide. 130 Her efforts included advice on the plan’s
technical aspects: “If you emit 3200 ppm of [carbon monoxide] for five or ten
minutes you will die within a half hour . . . . You can also just take a hose and
run that from the exhaust pipe to the rear window in your car and seal it with
duct tape and shirts, so it can’t escape.” 131 “[T]ake some Benadryls before just
in case and then you’ll breath it in and pass out and die very quickly and
peacefully with no pain at all. There is no way you can fail.” 132 Based off of

6015/michelle-carter-conrad-roy-iiis-girlfriend-charged-with-involuntary-manslaughter-for-hissuicide/.
125. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 26.
126. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 26.
127. Slifer, supra note 24.
128. See State-by-State Guide to Physician-Assisted Suicide, PROCON.ORG (Oct. 5, 2015),
http://euthanasia.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000132 (last visited Feb. 13, 2016)
[hereinafter “State-by-State Guide”].
129. Katie Franklin, Comment, Physician-Assisted Death, Dementia, and Euthanasia: Using
an Advances Directive to Facilitate the Desires of Those with Impending Memory Loss, 51 IDAHO
L. REV. 547, 552 (2015).
130. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 6.
131. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 6.
132. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 8.
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her research, Carter further proposed the idea of purchasing a carbon monoxide
tank, a regulator, and a feeding tube to go directly into Conrad’s lungs. 133 It
was her idea for Conrad to drive his truck to a parking lot in the daytime, an
area where no one would interfere with the plan or report him, and where his
suicide would be “less suspicious.” 134 “Just park your car and sit there and it
will take, like, 20 minutes. It’s not a big deal.” 135 Carter suggested specific
alternative suicide methods as well, such as a suffocating himself with a bag or
by hanging himself. 136 She then advised Conrad on how to conceal the
preparation and execution of the plan from his parents. 137
There is currently a great deal of debate surrounding the morality of
assisting someone to commit suicide, although most of it centers around
physician-assisted suicide. 138 In 1997, the United States Supreme Court
unanimously held that there is no Constitutional right to assisted suicide, which
left the states free to pass their own laws prohibiting it. 139 As a result, there are
forty states to date that have passed assisted suicide laws 140 although the
degree of punishment varies drastically for perpetrators, 141 similar to
cyberbullying laws. Many states define assisted suicide as a form of homicide,
most commonly manslaughter, but some consider it murder. 142 Contrarily,
other states punish perpetrators with professional discipline, a fine, or
damages. 143

133. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 6.
134. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 33.
135. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 10.
136. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 11.
137. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 10.
138. See Franklin, supra note 129, at 563. See, e.g., Massachusetts “Death with Dignity”
Initiative, Question 2 (2012), https://ballotpedia.org/Massachusetts_%22Death_with_Dignity%
22_Initiative,_Question_2_(2012). In 2012, Massachusetts’ “Death with Dignity” initiative was
on the November general election ballot as an indirect initiated state statute. Id. The proposed
measure would have allowed for terminally ill patients to be given lethal drugs, but it was
defeated. The petition number for the initiative was 11-12. Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 14401 (1997).
In 1997, President Clinton signed the Federal Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act of 1997,
which prohibits the use of federal funds in support of physician-assisted suicide (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 14401). Id.
139. Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705, 727 (1997) (holding Washington’s ban on
assisted suicide rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest).
140. Susan Zalkind, Is Telling Someone to Commit Suicide a Crime? VICE (Sept. 2, 2015),
http://www.vice.com/read/is-telling-someone-to-commit-suicide-a-crime-902.
141. See generally Zalkind, supra note 140.
142. See State-by-State Guide, supra note 128.
143. See State-by-State Guide, supra note 128. In some states, if a suicide or an attempted
suicide results, then the degree of punishment is worse.; see, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.215 (2016);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:4 (2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-6 (2016); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 22.08 (2015); PA. CONS. STAT. § 2505 (2016).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2017]

WORDS AS WEAPONS

129

A study found that only one-sixth of all reported assisted suicide cases are
prosecuted. 144 Since law enforcement and prosecutors appear reluctant to bring
forth charges in these cases, it seems fair to conclude that, as drafted, assisted
suicide laws may be unworkable. 145 This also lends itself to evidence that this
unwillingness to seek criminal sanctions is proof of law enforcement’s
sympathetic attitude towards violators and failure to see culpability. 146 If the
vast majority of assisted suicide cases are not investigated or prosecuted, then
statutory enforcement is not uniform which can result in serious injustice when
these laws are enforced. 147
Public policy surrounding assisted suicide also seems to be changing in
recent years. 148 While for a long time these laws have been long-standing
expressions of the states’ commitment to the preservation of human life, the
majority of Americans now believe that a person has a moral right to end their
own life if they are suffering. 149 Accordingly, there are five states that
explicitly allow for physicians to prescribe life-ending medication to patients
in this instance. 150
Of the states that make assisting suicide criminal, some prohibit the
broadly defined acts of “aiding” or “assisting” another person to commit
144. Catherine D. Shaffer, Note, Criminal Liability for Assisting Suicide, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
348, 370-71 (1986).
145. Shaffer, supra note 144, at 371.
146. Shaffer, supra note 144, at 371.
147. Shaffer, supra note 144, at 371.
148. Shaffer, supra note 144, at 367.
149. See, e.g., Should assisted suicide be legalized?, DEBATE.ORG, http://www.debate.org/
opinions/should-assisted-suicide-be-legalized (last visited Feb. 17, 2016). A recent poll shows
seventy-four percent of Americans believe assisted suicide should be legalized. Id. See generally
Justine R. Young, Article, Dead Wrong: The Problems with Assisted Suicide Statutes and
Prosecutions, 6 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV 123 (1994) (identifying the problems with assisted
suicide statutes and prosecutions even though suicide is not a crime in any state).
150. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 249, 275 (2006) (upholding Oregon’s Death
With Dignity Act (ODWDA) exempting civil or criminal liability to state-licensed physicians
who in compliance with ODWDA dispense or prescribe a lethal dose of drugs upon the request of
a terminally ill patient, codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (2006)); Patient Choice at End of
Life Act, 2013 Bill Text VT S.B. 77 (2013) (allowing Vermont residents with terminal diseases
the option to be described a lethal dose of drugs); Medicare End-of-Life Care Planning Act of
2007, 110 S. 466 (2007); Baxter v. State, No. ADV-2007-787, 2008 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 482, at
*36 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Dec. 5, 2008) (holding that a competent, terminally ill patient has a right to
die with dignity without violating Montana’s Constitution); Washington Death with Dignity Act,
REV. CODE WASH. (ARCW) § 70.245.901. All of these states require specific qualifications such
as the patient must be at least eighteen years of age, reside within the state, death must be
expected within six months, and the patient must orally request to the physician that they wish to
die on two separate occasions or at least fifteen days apart, in addition to one written request. See
Id. Montana is the only of the five states that has no legal protocol in place when it comes to the
age requirement, number of months until death is expected, or the number of requests to the
physician. Baxter, 2008 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 482, at *36.
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suicide. 151 However, several states have amended their statutes to further
require intent and causation. 152 Most importantly, many states have moved
away from broad prohibitions on “encouraging” or “advising” someone to
commit suicide and now explicitly require some physical act beyond pure
speech. 153 For example, Georgia defines assist as “the act of physically helping
or physically providing the means” to commit suicide. 154 In Arizona, it is
manslaughter to “intentionally provide the physical means that another person
uses to commit suicide, with the knowledge that the person intends to commit
suicide.” 155 Evidence of the states’ evolving definitions of what constitutes
assistance in carrying out assisted suicide and the further requirements of
intent, causation, and some physical act beyond pure speech, implies that these
broad assisted suicide laws that were encompassing words alone were
criminalizing acts not intended to be criminalized. Carving out the stringent
requirement of a physical act in order to convict someone further implies the
discomfort of prosecuting defendants based entirely on what they said. This
once again leads to the constitutional issues of criminalizing words alone.

151. Katherine Ann Wingfield & Carl S. Hacker, Physician-Assisted Suicide: An Assessment
and Comparison of Statutory Approaches Among the States, 32 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 13, 51
(2007). See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120(a)(2) (2015) (aiding another person to commit
suicide); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-104 (2016) (causing or aiding another person to commit
suicide); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-104(1)(b) (2016) (causing or aiding another person to commit
suicide); Fla. Stat. § 782.08 (2016) (deliberately assisting in the commission of self-murder).
152. James Schoeberl, Constitutional Law: How Minnesota Unconstitutionally Broadened Its
Assisted-Suicide Statute – State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 41 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 398, 413 n.126
(2015). See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120(a)(2) (2015); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-104(a)(2)
(2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-54a(a) (2016); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-2 (LexisNexis 2016);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060(1) (LexisNexis 2016). Louisiana, for example, is specific
in that assisted suicide is “the intentional advising, encouraging, or assisting, of another person to
commit suicide, or the participation in any physical act which causes, aids, abets, or assists
another person in committing or attempting to commit suicide.” LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.12(A)(2)
(2016). Some states take this a step further and distinguish “aiding” and “causing.” For example,
in Delaware, a defendant is guilty if he or she “intentionally aids another person to commit
suicide,” but is charged with manslaughter if he or she “intentionally causes another person to
commit suicide” or murder if he or she “intentionally causes another person to commit suicide by
force or duress.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 645 (2016).
153. Schoeberl, supra note 152, at 413, 428. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-4017(1) (2016); 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-34.5(a)(2) (2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5407(a)(2) (2016); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 216.302(2) (LexisNexis 2015); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-102 (LexisNexis
2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-622.1(A) (2016); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-2.5(b) (LexisNexis
2016); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3141.3 (2016); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS §11-60-3 (2016); S.C. CODE §
16-3-1090(B)(2) (2016); IOWA CODE § 707A.2 (2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-216(a)
(2016).
154. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-5(a)(1) (2016).
155. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-5-5(A)(3) (2015).
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Constitutional Freedom of Speech Protections Revisited: State v.
Melchert-Dinkel

One of Carter’s affirmative defenses is that her words are protected by the
First Amendment and Article XVI’s free speech safeguards. 156 Even though
Massachusetts, Carter and Conrad’s home state, lacks an assisted suicide law
all together, the convicted defendant’s conduct in State v. Melchert-Dinkel
closely resembles Carter’s actions. This case is also a prime example of states’
assisted suicide statutes evolving in recent years due to the protections of the
First Amendment. 157 In 2012, Melchert-Dinkel was convicted under
Minnesota’s assisted suicide statute. 158 There, the defendant posed online as a
depressed and suicidal female nurse under various aliases. 159 He responded to
posts on suicide websites presenting himself as a caring and compassionate
friend who understood his victims’ plight and wanted to help. 160 MelchertDinkel described step-by-step how to commit suicide by tying a rope to a
doorknob and slinging the rope over the top of the door, similar to how Carter
provided step-by-step instructions to Conrad on how to poison himself in his
truck. 161 One of Melchert-Dinkel’s victims suffered from mental health issues
and was debating on whether or not to commit suicide. 162 After four days of
ongoing electronic communications with Melchert-Dinkel who persistently
pressured the victim to take his own life, the victim hanged himself utilizing
Melchert-Dinkel’s proposed suicide method. 163 Like Melchert-Dinkel, Carter
also knew Conrad suffered from depression, yet encouraged Conrad to commit
suicide through text messages and promoted her well-researched suicide
method. 164
Minnesota’s assisted suicide statute under which Melchert-Dinkel was
prosecuted made it illegal to “intentionally advise, encourage, or assist in
taking the other’s own life.” 165 Later in 2014, Melchert-Dinkel was tried again
in the Minnesota Supreme Court which reversed the decision and convicted
him only of “assisting” a suicide, thereby striking the words “encouraging” and
“advising” from the statute. 166 The court found that the part of the law that
banned someone from “encouraging” or “advising” suicide was
unconstitutional, but upheld the part of the law that makes it a crime to “assist”
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 37.
See State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 2014).
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d at 17.
Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 26.
Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d at 17. See also MINN. STAT. § 609.215(1).
Id. at 18.
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in someone’s suicide despite the fact these words appear interchangeable. 167
On remand, the court held that to “assist” someone requires “a level of
involvement in the suicide beyond merely expressing a moral viewpoint or
providing general comfort and support.” 168 In applying the majority’s
reasoning to Conrad’s case, Carter would be convicted under the Minnesota
statute if the prosecution could prove that her text messages rose to “a level of
involvement in the suicide beyond merely expressing a moral viewpoint or
providing general comfort and support” and that there was a “direct, causal
connection” between Carter’s words and Conrad’s actions to commit suicide.
Given Conrad’s state of mental health, the prosecution would have a difficult
task proving that Conrad would not have committed suicide without Carter’s
text messages.
In Justice Page’s dissent he agreed with the majority that barring speech
that “advises” or “encourages” suicide is unconstitutional; however, he
disagreed with the court’s remand to determine whether Melchert-Dinkel’s
speech “assisted” the victims in taking their own lives. 169 He contended that
according to the definition of “assist” in the dictionary there was insufficient
evidence to prove that Melchert-Dinkel assisted in the suicides due to lack of a
physical act. 170 Justice Page pointed out that the majority’s decision to avoid
this dictionary definition of assist was “telling” since it seemed to require a
physical act. 171 Additionally, Minnesota’s assisted suicide statute is analogous
to its aiding and abetting statute which requires a physical act beyond mere
words. 172 Justice Page reasoned that without some action “more concrete than
speech,” the publication of a book outlining suicide methods could be a
violation of the First Amendment. 173 Even by further requiring a direct, causal
link between the speech and suicide, Justice Page’s book example also
suggests a direct, causal link because it targets an entire population of mentally
unstable and potentially suicidal people. 174 The assessment of whether a direct,
causal link exists between the victim and the person assisting suicide is
arguably arbitrary. Even more so, Conrad’s suicidal predisposition would
likely sever the causal chain.

167. Id.
168. Id. The court defined “assist” to be consistent with the plain meaning of the word;
speech or conduct that provides another person with what is needed for the person to commit
suicide. Id. (emphasis added).
169. Id. at 25.
170. Id. Using the same dictionary that the majority relied on, “assist” can be defined as “[a]n
act of helping” and to help “a person in necessity; an action, process, or result.”
171. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d at 25. The majority’s analysis instead relies on the
definition of the word “help,” a word not used in the language of the statute.
172. Schoeberl, supra note 152, at 422. see, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.05, 609.215.
173. Schoeberl, supra note 152, at 422.
174. Schoeberl, supra note 152, at 422.
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It is important to note that suicide itself is not considered a crime in the
United States, nor is attempted suicide or the discussion of suicide; rather, it is
“considered an expression of mental illness.” 175 Since one of the categories of
speech that is not afforded First Amendment protections is speech generated in
connection with illegal activities, in the event that suicide was an illegal act,
Carter could be found guilty of “inciting or producing imminent lawless
action.” 176 However, since suicide is not unlawful conduct, this First
Amendment exception does not apply to Conrad’s case. Counterintuitively,
assisted suicide laws are examples of legislatures criminalizing people for
assisting others to carry out legal acts. 177 Even a surviving member of a suicide
pact may be charged as an aider or abetter of suicide. 178 Despite the relatively
low number of cases in the United States where a party to a suicide pact has
been charged with assisted suicide, it is poor public policy to criminalize those
contemplating suicide that instead choose to live. 179 Overall, there is a certain
perverseness about legislatures punishing one who aids an act that is not itself
a crime. 180
C. The Necessity for More Stringent Assisted Suicide Statutes
The Minnesota Supreme Court striking the verbs “encourage” and “advise”
from their assisted suicide statute, in addition to the many states that recently
added a requirement of some physical act beyond pure speech, intent, and
causation in their assisted suicide laws, all lend themselves to the conclusion
that convicting someone based purely on their words is problematic. Whether
Carter was being tried in a state with a stringent assisted suicide law or in a
state where speech alone constitutes assistance, all of these statutes come with
serious public policy concerns. Further magnifying the major inconsistencies
among the states, there are five states that explicitly legalize assisted suicide
and five others that are silent on the issue. If states are insistent upon keeping
their laws that ban assisted suicide, I suggest that they strike behaviors such as
“encourage” or “advise” from their laws just as Minnesota did subsequent to
Melchert-Dinkel. By criminalizing words of encouragement and advice,
legislatures are prohibiting broad sweeps of communication and

175. In re Joseph G., 667 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Cal. 1983) (discussing the American legal view of
suicide). One commentator reasoned, “punishing suicide is contrary to modern penal and
psychological theory.” Derrick Augustus Carter, Knight in the Duel With Death: Physician
Assisted Suicide and the Medical Necessity Defense, 41 VILL L. REV. 663 (1996).
176. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). See also United States v. Williams 553 U.S.
285, 303 (2008).
177. Schoeberl, supra note 152, at 420.
178. Shaffer, supra note 144, at 366.
179. Shaffer, supra note 144, at 366 (psychiatric treatment would be more appropriate than
criminal sanctions).
180. Shaffer, supra note 144, at 366.
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simultaneously breaching the First Amendment. These states should further
strike broad acts such as “aid” and “assist” from their statutes because these
laws would likely be deemed constitutionally vague.
I next suggest the states adopt more stringent assisted suicide laws that
further require proof of intent, causation, and a physical act. Evidence of some
states already adding these elements and moving away from prohibitions on
“encouraging” or “advising” someone to commit suicide, suggests that laws
where speech alone constitutes assistance are criminalizing words not intended
to be criminalized. With such a small percentage of reported assisted suicide
cases being prosecuted, by adopting these proposed amendments, the statutes
would be more specific and would offer law enforcement and prosecutors clear
guidance in order to successfully bring forth these charges. These proposed
statutes are superior to current state statutes because a streamlined definition of
assistance will remove the obscure assessment of what constitutes assistance in
order to reach a conviction. By no means should cyber-based encouragement
alone fall within the scope of any states’ assisted suicide laws because
anything broader would likely not withstand First Amendment challenges.
Conrad’s case once again brings attention to the disharmony of the states’
promulgation of statutes surrounding convictions based on pure speech.
Nevertheless, if Massachusetts were to make these proposed amendments,
Carter’s text messages would be an insufficient act to constitute assistance.
The First Amendment once again suggests that just because conduct is
reprehensible, does not mean it is criminal.
III. INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER
A.

The Seeming Need for a Physical Act in Massachusetts: Persampieri v.
Commonwealth

The majority of states issue statutes solely addressing assisted suicide and
recognize it as a unique offense; however, there are eight states that include
assisted suicide in their manslaughter or homicide statutes. 181 While Carter and
Conrad’s home state of Massachusetts is one of the states with no explicit
statute that prohibits assisted suicide, Massachusetts’ manslaughter statute has
a case in the notes following the statute from the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts that is related to assisted suicide. 182 The note is about a case,
Persampieri v. Commonwealth, that reads “husband aiding wife to commit
suicide could be found guilty of involuntary manslaughter.” 183 Although the

181. Wingfield & Hacker, supra note 151, at 53. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 565.023 (a
person commits the crime of voluntary manslaughter if he knowingly assists another in the
commission of self-murder).
182. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265 § 13(2) (LexisNexis 2016).
183. Id.
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facts in Persampieri are comparable to Conrad’s case, Carter’s actions can be
distinguished due to her lack of physical assistance in the suicide.
In Persampieri, the defendant informed his wife that he was going to file
for divorce after they returned home from a social gathering. 184 The wife had
been drinking and was in a fragile emotional state when she threatened to
commit suicide. 185 The defendant reminded her that she had attempted suicide
on two prior occasions and said she was “chicken . . . and wouldn’t do it.” 186
He then told her to go and get the .22 caliber rifle in the kitchen. 187 When the
wife unsuccessfully tried to load the gun, the defendant loaded it for her and
handed the gun back to his wife. 188 “She put . . . [it] between her legs with the
butt . . . on the floor and the muzzle barrel against her forehead.” 189 His wife
tried to reach the trigger, but was unable to. 190 At the advice of her husband,
she removed her shoe so she could reach the trigger, and the gun discharged. 191
The wife died the following day, and the defendant was convicted of
involuntary manslaughter for the reckless disregard of his wife’s safety and the
possible consequences of his conduct. 192 Similar to the victim in Persampieri,
Conrad had mental health issues and previously attempted to take his own life;
still Carter continued to goad him with his suicidal thoughts. Arguably,
Persampieri is precedent that assisted suicide is prohibited in Massachusetts, at
least under common law. 193 Nonetheless, Carter’s case can be distinguished
from Persampieri who handed his wife a loaded gun because there was no
physical exchange between Carter and Conrad. Likewise, Carter was not in the
same proximity as Conrad, but was in a location far away on a cell phone when
he committed suicide. 194
B.

The Prosecution’s Prima Facie Claim: Commonwealth of Massachusetts
v. Michelle Carter

Carter was indicted on involuntary manslaughter charges, “an unlawful
homicide unintentionally caused by an act which constitutes such disregard of
probable harmful consequences to another as to amount to wanton or reckless
conduct.” 195 In Massachusetts, there is no statutory definition of manslaughter;
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Persampieri v. Commonwealth, 343 N.E.2d Mass. 19, 22 (1961).
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Id. at 22–23.
Persampieri, 343 N.E.2d at 19, 23.
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Zalkind, supra note 140.
Commonwealth v. Life Care Ctrs. Of Am., Inc., 456 N.E.2d 826, 836 (Mass. 2010).
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its elements are derived from common law. 196 In order to prove involuntary
manslaughter: (1) the defendant’s conduct must have been intentional; (2) the
conduct must have been wanton and reckless; and (3) the conduct must have
been the cause of the victim’s death. 197
In order to prove that Carter acted with the requisite intent, the first
element of the crime, the prosecution heavily relies on Carter telling Conrad to
get back in the truck when he feared that the plan was working. 198 On the day
of the suicide, Carter’s final text message to Conrad read, “You can do this.” 199
Three minutes later Conrad called Carter, and they talked on the phone for
ninety minutes. 200 At some point during that call, Conrad got out of the car
“because [the carbon monoxide poisoning] was working and he got scared.” 201
Carter “told him to get back in.” 202 Second, Carter’s forceful assistance and
counsel over the course of the week prior to Conrad’s suicide, and not just
during the incident, is further evidence she intended for Conrad to take his own
life. 203 Finally, the prosecution looks to Carter’s ploys to get attention after
Conrad’s death to prove her intent. 204 After the suicide, Carter published
Facebook and Twitter posts about Conrad: “Even though I could not save my
boyfriend’s life, I want to put myself out here to try to save as many other lives
as possible.” 205 Carter created a Facebook event for a fundraiser that she
organized in Conrad’s memory. 206 She held the fundraiser in her hometown, a
considerable distance from Conrad’s hometown. 207 When Conrad’s friend,
Tom, proposed holding the tournament closer to Conrad’s friends and family,
Carter became upset. 208 Carter told Tom, “[T]his was my idea. I created it to be
here.” 209 When Tom shared the Facebook event through his Facebook account,
Carter asked him, “You’re not taking credit for my idea though; right?
LOL.” 210 At the tournament, Tom noticed that Carter was acting strange and
seeking attention. 211 Conrad’s sisters said they felt uncomfortable because they
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did not know anyone there. 212 While Carter’s conduct subsequent to the
suicide does not portray her in a positive light, she arguably resembles a
typical teenage girl. By alleging that these actions constitute intent is a difficult
argument for the prosecution to make in proving their heavy burden.
To prove the second element, the prosecutors rely on the facts of
Persampieri as support that her conduct was “wanton or reckless,” i.e.
“intentional conduct . . . involving a high degree of likelihood that substantial
harm will result to another.” 213 Recall that the defendant in Persampieri
handed his emotionally unstable wife a loaded gun that discharged when she
removed her shoe at the advice of her husband, and therefore the defendant
was convicted of involuntary manslaughter. 214 The prosecution reasons that,
like the defendant in Persampieri, Carter knew Conrad had previously
attempted to commit suicide and that he was planning to do it again, yet
continued to provoke Conrad with texts like “[y]ou always say you’re gonna
do it, but never do.” 215 Carter was in a position of trust as Conrad’s confidant
and had specific knowledge that her relationship with him was one of the
reasons he had not already committed suicide, further demonstrating her
reckless behavior. 216 Carter offered Conrad comfort by convincing him that his
family and friends would understand and that his parents would not be afflicted
with emotional distress, but would “get over it and move on.” 217 The
prosecution also points to Carter’s failure to alleviate the risk created by her
actions as wanton or reckless behavior. 218 They contend that if an individual’s
actions create a life-threatening condition, there is a duty to take reasonable
steps to alleviate the risk created. 219 Carter allegedly had days to report
Conrad’s purchase of a combustion engine and hours to warn authorities the
day of the incident. 220 Nevertheless, not only can Carter’s actions be
distinguished from Persampieri because she did not affirmatively assist in the
suicide by handing Conrad a loaded gun, but under Commonwealth v. Pugh,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that “proof of recklessness

212. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 22.
213. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 24-25 (quoting Commonwealth v. Pugh, 462 Mass.
482, 496 (2012)).
214. See Persampieri v. Commonwealth, 343 N.E.2d 19, 19 (1961).
215. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 25. See, e.g. Carter’s text messages: “I just want to
make sure tonight is the real thing.” “You can’t keep pushing it off, though. That’s all you keep
doing.” “When are you gonna do it? Stop ignoring the question???” “There isn’t anything anyone
can do to save you, not even yourself.” “WELL WHEN ARE YOU GETTING [THE
GENERATOR]?” “The time is right.”
216. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 26.
217. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 2.
218. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 29.
219. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 29.
220. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 30.
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requires more than a mistake of judgment or even gross negligence.” 221 In that
case, the Court held that there was insufficient evidence to convict the
defendant on a theory of wanton or reckless behavior when the defendant’s
failure to call for assistance, i.e. omission to act, was the proximate cause of
the death that resulted. 222 While Carter may have been grossly negligent, her
failure to alleviate the risk likely does not constitute wanton or reckless
behavior.
In support of the third element of causation, the prosecution again relies on
the reasoning in Persampieri: “[A] defendant can cause a victim’s death by
influencing and enabling him to take his own life.” 223 The prosecution focuses
on Carter telling Conrad “to get back in” when he exited the truck while in a
suicidal state and suffering from the effects of carbon monoxide poisoning. 224
As in many cases of assisted suicide, causation proves to be a significant
hurdle for the prosecution. 225 For involuntary manslaughter, as with all
homicides, the defendant’s acts must be the proximate cause of the victim’s
death, i.e. but for the defendant’s actions, the death would not have ensued. In
1816, Commonwealth v. Bowen was the first assisted suicide case that took
place in the United States and coincidentally it was in Massachusetts. 226 Other
courts have presented similar doctrines of causation as laid out in Bowen. 227
There, the defendant was indicted in a lower court feloniously for counseling,
persuading, and procuring a fellow prisoner, Jewett, to hang himself the day
before Jewett was scheduled to be executed. 228 The Commonwealth appealed,
maintaining that advising someone to murder themselves was in itself
murder. 229 The relevant inquiry was whether the prisoner was instrumental in
the suicide of Jewett, by advice or otherwise. 230 The jury instructions
concentrated on the question of causation – whether or not the defendant’s
advice actually had any influence on Jewett and thereby brought about the
effect intended. 231 The jury found the prisoner not guilty; probably from a
doubt whether the advice given by him was, in any measure, the procuring

221. 969 N.E.2d 672, 685 (Mass. 2012).
222. Id. at 676.
223. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 31 (quoting Persampieri v. Commonwealth, 343
N.E.2d 19, 22–23 (1961)).
224. Resp. to Def.’s Mot., supra note 1, at 32.
225. John A. Alesandro, Physician-Assisted Suicide And New York Law, 57 ALB. L. REV.
820, 829 (1994).
226. Id. at 829.
227. Id. at 830.
228. Commonwealth. v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356, 356 (1816).
229. Id. at 359.
230. Id.
231. Alesandro, supra note 225, at 829.
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cause of Jewett’s death. 232 Under Bowen, Carter’s advice likely was not the
“procuring cause” of Conrad’s suicide.
An act is a cause of a victim’s death if the act, in a natural and continuous
sequence, results in death, and without the act, death would not have
occurred. 233 Carter’s defense attorney argues that there is no evidence that
Carter caused Conrad’s death because he obtained and ran the combustion
engine himself, while she was in a distant location on a cell phone. 234 On the
same basis, Conrad’s decision to commit suicide constituted an intervening
event which would insulate Carter from criminal liability. 235 The defense
contends that there is no evidence that Carter “provided the means” or “set into
action” the events which led to the suicide. 236 Once again Conrad’s mental
health issues and previous attempt at suicide imply that he likely had a
predisposition to take his own life despite Carter’s supportive words. 237 Conrad
also left a suicide note, lending itself to the conclusion that Conrad thought his
plan out and left his house that morning with the intent to take his own life. 238
While a grand jury decided there was sufficient evidence to indict Carter with
probable cause of each element of involuntary manslaughter, the prosecution
has major hurdles to overcome in order to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that Carter committed manslaughter.
IV. THE PROPOSAL: TEXT MESSAGES ARE AN INSUFFICIENT ACTUS REUS
After analyzing Carter’s actions under various cyberbullying, assisted
suicide, and involuntary manslaughter laws, it would be difficult to convict her
of any crime in many states. While few would argue that Carter’s actions were
reprehensible, this does not mean they are criminal. Coincidentally, each
analysis suffered from the same issues: the seeming need for a physical act
beyond pure speech, the causal chain between Carter’s text messages and
Conrad’s death being severed by his suicidal predisposition, and the
protections afforded from freedom of speech under the First Amendment.
Carter’s case will likely center around whether words in and of themselves can
lead to criminal culpability and whether certain electronic communications,
such as text messages, are protected under the First Amendment. 239
Unfortunately for our litigious society, just because something is repugnant
does not automatically transform it into a criminal act. Our First Amendment
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jurisprudence recognizes that all members of society will in many instances be
exposed to unpleasant and even repugnant speech, ranging from rude
comments to racial slurs. 240 The only proper recourse is to develop emotional
resiliency for the law cannot intervene in every case where someone’s
emotions have been affected, nor would most citizens want laws to. 241 Implicit
in the right to engage in protected activities is “a corresponding right to
associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of social, political, economic,
educational, religious, and cultural ends.” 242
It is no coincidence that the same issues surfaced in the analysis of each
crime. By allowing a seventeen-year-old girl’s text messages alone to suffice
as a weapon in the manslaughter of her mentally ill teenage boyfriend, society
would undoubtedly be lead down a slippery slope. The State would do well to
leave punishment to tort law rather than attempt the arduous task of drafting
cyberbullying, assisted suicide, and involuntary manslaughter statutes with
enough precision and specificity to withstand First Amendment challenges and
still simultaneously punish Carter’s words. 243 Legislatures need to admit to
their constituents that some social behaviors must be curtailed through
educating, socializing, and stigmatizing perpetrators as opposed to
criminalizing their speech. 244
CONCLUSION
While Carter’s conduct contains components of cyberbullying, assisted
suicide, and involuntary manslaughter, there is no statute that perfectly fits the
circumstances. Even if the legislatures create a more tightly drawn response to
severe cases like Conrad’s by amending existing statutes, her text messages are
still not enough to constitute an actus reus in a criminal conviction. Society has
a long history of being uncomfortable with convictions based on words alone,
and the only evidence the prosecution has in Conrad’s case are Carter’s text
messages. The combination of First Amendment protections, Conrad’s history
of depression, and his previous suicide attempt, raise reasonable doubt that
Conrad committed suicide solely because of Carter’s text messages.
Furthermore, the state of Carter’s own mental health creates an impression that
the prosecution may be attempting to criminalize mental illness. While a quick
glimpse of Carter’s text messages leaves most people troubled, her words
likely are not and should not be illegal, as potentially unsatisfying as that may
be. Criminal law cannot be used to punish every social transgression,
especially when many of those transgressions are committed through

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Lidksy & Garcia, supra note 32, at 724.
Lidksy & Garcia, supra note 32, at 724.
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).
Lidksy & Garcia, supra note 32, at 724.
Lidksy & Garcia, supra note 32, at 725.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2017]

WORDS AS WEAPONS

141

speech. 245 The uncomfortable truth is that Michelle Carter did something
disgraceful, but she should not be found a criminal.
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